Legal Damages for Losses of Chances by Schweizer, Urs
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 · www.sfbtr15.de 
Universität Mannheim · Freie Universität Berlin · Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn · Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Urs Schweizer · Department of Economics · University of Bonn · D-53113  Bonn, 
Phone: +49(228) 73 9220 · Fax: +49 (228) 73 9221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 2008 
 
 
*Urs Schweizer: Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn, Germany, 
schweizer@uni-bonn.de 
 
 
 
 
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. 
Discussion Paper No. 235 
Legal Damages for Losses of 
Chances 
Urs Schweizer* 
 
Legal Damages for Losses of Chances
Urs Schweizer,∗†University of Bonn
February 22, 2008
Abstract
This paper deals with legal damages if losses of chances are at
stake. In response to disparate ad hoc rules that have emerged from
legal practice in Europe, the present paper proposes a unifying prin-
ciple to handle such cases. Quite generally, the purpose of a damages
award is to compensate the claimant and should be based on the dif-
ference in value between due performance and actual performance.
To cope with limited observability, it is suggested to still award the
difference though on average over the observed event. The paper cal-
culates damages in line with this general principle. The proposed
damage scheme is shown to fully compensate the victim and to pro-
vide efficient incentives for precaution, be it that multiple injurers act
non-cooperatively or in concert, even if losses of chances are at stake.
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1 Introduction
Three European courts were facing cases of the following type. A medical
practitioner negligently provided a faulty diagnosis such that the correct
treatment was postponed. Yet, even under correct treatment, the patient
would have been cured with a probability of less than one. Should the prac-
titioner be held liable and, if yes, to what extent? A court in England denied
damages because, according to the court’s view, the patient had failed to
establish that the practitioner’s wrongdoing has actually caused the loss. A
court in Germany awarded full damages because, according to this court’s
view, the practitioner had failed to establish that his wrongdoing was not
the cause of the patient’s loss. A court in the Netherlands, finally, awarded
damages amounting to that percentage of the patient’s actual loss with which
the patient would have been cured.1
Of a similar characteristic are cases involving attorneys whose clients,
due to the attorney’s negligent behavior, have lost at trial but would still
have lost with a positive probability in the absence of the attorney’s mistake.
Again, courts in Europe tend to rule such cases in a rather nonuniform way.
Worse, courts even in the same country apparently treat cases differently
according to whether the negligent party happens to be a physician or an
attorney.2
Why is it so difficult to rule such cases and why are European courts
coming up with rather disparate solutions in spite of the fact that the involved
legal systems share central principles of damage rules? In fact, the purpose
of a damages award for breach of contract (or for tort) is to compensate
the claimant and should be based on the difference in value between the
performance as provided and that agreed or, in tort cases, that resulting
from meeting the negligence standard. In Germany, this basic principle is
referred to as the difference hypothesis.
Conceptual difficulties possibly arise with the difference hypothesis as the
actual situation under the party’s negligent decision must be compared with
the purely hypothetical one that would have resulted if, ceteris paribus, the
party had met his obligation. Yet, what exactly does ceteris paribus mean if
1For details, the reader may wish to consult Mäsch (2004).
2See Mäsch (2004) again.
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the loss would still have occurred with positive probability even under proper
treatment? In such cases, the exact difference between the actual and the
hypothetical value remains uncertain.
The major piece of work on the determination of civil liability under
such uncertainty is due to Shavell (1985).3 On efficiency grounds, Shavell
argues in favor of liability in proportion to the probability of causation. His
approach requires the assumption that each accident — an event involving
a loss of wealth — is caused by exactly one entity. An entity may be one
of several potential human injurers or it may be the ”natural agent”. In
contrast, the present paper takes into account that causation could also be
of a more interactive nature as the following stylized setting illustrates.
The victim consumes three randomly chosen units of a good, each of
which possibly contains a toxic factor. If two or less of the units contain the
toxic factor no harm occurs to the victim. Yet, if all three units (or more)
are toxic the victim suffers from harm equivalent to, say, 90 units of wealth.
Imagine, by picking three units at random, the victim was hapless enough
ending up with three toxic units. Suppose two units were supplied by injurer
1, the third one by injurer 2. As a consequence, the victim’s wealth is actually
reduced by 90 units of wealth. Yet, none of the entities can be said to have
caused the accident entirely on its own. Rather, causation is of a more
interactive nature and courts would probably hold the two injurers liable in
proportion to their contribution of toxic factors for 60 and 30 units of wealth,
respectively.
If it were just known that the victim has obtained three toxic units but the
exact sources of these factors remain uncertain, courts tend to hold the two
potential injurers liable in proportion of their market shares even if market
shares may differ from the shares obtained by the particular victim at hand.
Market shares are taken as a proxy for the unknown proportions. In fact, as
will be shown in the paper, market shares can be interpreted as the expected
value of the (unobservable) true proportions.
Let me now turn to the conceptually more difficult situation where one
of the two entities is the ”natural agent”. The toxic factor may have invaded
a unit as a consequence of the human injurer’s negligence or, alternatively,
it may have been added by nature. As a consequence, even in the absence of
3In contrast to the present study, Shavell’s analysis refelcts the U.S. legal system.
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the human injurer, the victim may pick up three units containing the toxic
factor. This fact must be faced when applying the difference hypothesis.
The actual situation is that the human injurer was present and the victim
has picked up three toxic units. The hypothetical situation may be visualized
by the following thought experiment. The victim would again have to pick
up three units of the good at random but this time from a different box
with a different composition of toxic and non-toxic units. If she picks up
two or less toxic units the accidents is avoided in the hypothetical situation
and, according to the difference hypothesis, correct legal damages would be
equal to the full reduction of the victim’s wealth. If, however, she picks up
three toxic units as in the actual situation correct legal damages, according
to the difference hypothesis, would be zero. Whether or not the accident
is occurring in the hypothetical situation cannot be observed. The natural
way out, again, would be to award legal damages in line with the difference
hypothesis though, for lack of observability, on average over the observed
event. In the example at hand, such average legal damages would be equal
to the probability with which the accident were avoided in the hypothetical
situation multiplied by the size of the loss.
Most economic studies of tort law — including Shavell (1985) — are depart-
ing from the accident model: A loss of fixed size L is assumed to occur with a
probability that depends on the level of precaution. By choosing insufficient
precaution, the injurer has violated his obligation. Even at this negligent
level, the loss would not have to occur for sure but suppose it did. Moreover,
at the non-negligent level of precaution the accident would still occur with
positive probability, say, εo > 0.
The difference hypothesis requires to compare the actual situation with
the hypothetical one that would have resulted from non-negligent precau-
tion. At that point, the exact interpretation of the probability εo matters.
Suppose the fact that, under negligent precaution, an accident has occurred
does not allow to update beliefs on whether or not an accident would also
have occurred in the hypothetical situation where the injurer had met his
obligation. Then, for the same reason as in the above example, legal dam-
ages on average over the observed event amount to (1− εo) ·L. Notice, these
are exactly the damages, which the court in the Netherlands has awarded.
Alternatively, the probabilities of the accident model may refer to uncer-
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tainty that is type-contingent in the following sense. The probabilities are
derived from relative frequencies of test series of cases that differ in type,
which however injurers and courts are unable to distinguish. Nonetheless,
the observed event — an accident has actually happened under negligent be-
havior — may allow to update the (hypothetical) probability with which the
accident would still have happened if the injurer had met his obligation. Av-
eraging out over the observed event would still be the doctrine to follow but
would possibly lead to a different quantum of damages.
As an illustration of type-contingent uncertainty, consider the following
setting which may mimic some of the malpractice cases though, of course,
in a rather stylized way. Nature randomly selects one ball — the patient’s
type — out of a box containing known numbers of small, medium and large
balls. Large balls reflect types that are cured even under improper treatment.
Medium sized balls stand for patients that are cured but only under proper
treatment. Small balls, finally, correspond to types that are never cured, not
even if treatment was proper.
The injurer’s negligence was to use, figuratively speaking, a coarsely
meshed net letting pass all but big balls whereas his obligation consisted
of using a finely woven net instead that would let pass only the small balls.
If the net is letting pass a ball, the accident occurs. When deciding about
the mesh size of his net, the injurer does not know the size of the ball chosen
by nature. Notice, causation would be interactive again and could not be
attributed uniquely to one of the entities.
Suppose an accident has actually occurred. Even if the exact size of
the ball cannot be observed, the mere fact that an accident has occurred
rules out that the ball was big. If it was of medium size then correct legal
damages, according to the difference hypothesis, would be equal to the full
loss whereas if it was small, correct legal damages would be zero as the use of
a finely woven net would not have avoided the accident. Since the exact size
of the ball, small or medium, is not known legal damages should be awarded
on average over the observed event.
In this setting, ceteris paribus would mean that the random choice of
nature is kept fixed when the actual situation, as a thought experiment, has to
be compared with the hypothetical situation where the human injurer is using
a finely woven net. As it turns out, in this setting, Shavell’s proportionality
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rule emerges but with an interpretation that takes the interactive nature of
causation into account.
The above examples indicate that a common doctrine — awarding correct
legal damages on average over the observed event — allows to handle rather
disparate situations. The quantum of damages emerging under this doctrine
depends on the structure of the interaction between nature and injurers.
Damages awarded according to the above doctrine compensate the victim for
losses resulting from the injurer’s deviation. Moreover, they provide efficient
incentives provided that the injurer’s obligation obeys the Hand Formula.
These are the major findings of the paper, which is organized as follows.
Section 2 revisits the traditional accident model. The quantum of correct
damages on average over observable events is explicitly determined. The
examples capturing the contamination of victims as well as the one where
nature selects the unobservable type of patients are spelled out in detail.
Section 3 examines the more realistic situation involving losses of variable
size. As it turns out, the approach based on the difference hypothesis easily
extends to general distributions whereas Shavell’s proportionality rule seems
confined to the binary setting of the traditional accident model. Section
4 replaces the natural agent by a second human injurer who, in contrast
to nature, may be held to share liability. An example is discussed where
liability in proportion to market shares can be interpreted as taking averages
over the observed event. Section 5 examines a general setting with multiple
human injurers interacting with nature. It is shown that, from the efficiency
perspective, details of how the injurers have to share liability do not matter.
If the damage scheme obeys the Hand Formula, the victim is at least as well
off as if the injurers had met their obligations and, by meeting his obligation,
each injurer can unilaterally escape liability then the scheme provides efficient
incentives for precaution, no matter whether the human injurers act non-
cooperatively or in concert. Section 6 concludes.
2 The accident model revisited
Party A is facing a decision r ∈ R at costs c(r) that affects the value of party
B’s assets (B’s wealth) in an uncertain way. An accident may or may not
occur. If the accident occurs then B’s wealth is reduced by a fixed amount
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L whereas, if there is none, the value of B’s assets stays constant. Moreover,
it is known from test series of similar cases that the relative frequency of an
accident amounts to 0 ≤ ε(r) ≤ 1 provided that A has taken decision r ∈ R.
If this test series consists of sufficiently many independent draws, ε(r) can
also be referred to as the probability of an accident.
The economic analysis of tort law refers to the setting at hand as the
accident model. The model serves to investigate incentives for precaution
arising from negligence rules. Suppose it were A’s obligation to decide ro ∈ R
but, instead, A has actually decided rn 9= ro.4 By such negligent behavior,
A has saved private costs, i.e. cn = c(rn) < co = c(ro) but, at the same time,
has raised the probability of an accident, i.e. εn = ε(rn) > εo = ε(ro).
In order to specify the quantum of legal damages (if any), which A owes
to B, the actual situation must be compared with the hypothetical one that
would have resulted if A had met his obligation. Conceptual difficulties
arise as soon as the probability of an accident remains positive even if the
obligation was met. In this case, meeting the obligation would not rule out
the accident for sure but would merely improve the chances of avoiding it.
What quantum of damages should be granted for the corresponding loss of
a chance under negligent behavior?
To illustrate the issues at stake, the following example is considered, which
captures the contamination of a victim from uncertain sources in a stylized
way. The toxic factors are supplied by party A or, alternatively, by nature.
Under negligent behavior, Kn toxic among a total of In + Kn units are
around. If A had met his obligation, still Ko < Kn toxic among a total of
Io +Ko units would be around. In the actual (as well as the hypothetical)
situation, party B is assumed to draw a sample of size H at random. If his
sample happens to contain kc toxic units or more, B’s wealth is reduced by
L. If it contains less, his wealth is not affected. The probabilities of accidents
can easily be obtained from the hypergeometric distribution. If Ko > kc (as
I assume) then the probability of an accident remains positive indeed, even
if A had met his obligation.
Suppose it is known that, by choosing rn, party A has neglected his
obligation and an accident has actually occurred, i.e. party B’s wealth is
4Instead of a tort relationship, the obligation may also arise from a contractual
relationship.
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reduced by L. According to the difference hypothesis, the actual situation
must be compared with the hypothetical one where A had met his obligation.
Notice, in the hypothetical situation, party B would have to draw, by a
thought experiment, another sample of size H, which would contain k toxic
units with probability
πok =

Ko
k

·

Io
H−k


Ko+Io
H

and, hence, the probability that the accident would have been avoided in the
hypothetical situation amounts to 1− εo = Skc−1k=0 πok. The correct quantum
of legal damages should be L if the hypothetical sample contains less than
kc toxic elements, whereas it should be zero, if it contains (as in the actual
situation) kc toxic elements or more. Therefore, on average, the quantum of
legal damages would amount to d = (1− εo) · L.
To make use of the difference hypothesis beyond the above example, the
interaction between party A and nature must be expressed in what game
theorists call normal form.5 From this perspective, nature is perceived as
simultaneously ”choosing” from a set ω ∈ Ω of alternative moves — the out-
come space — as party A is choosing from his set r ∈ R of strategies. While
A is assumed to behave strategically, nature is assumed to be governed by
an exogenous probability measure π: For any subset (event) Ω of the out-
come space Ω, π(Ω) denotes the probability, with which the event Ω occurs.
The accident model in normal form combines this probability measure with
a function e : R × Ω → {0, 1}, referred to as the accident technology. By
construction, the accident technology attains the value e(r,ω) = 1 if and
only if an accident is resulting from the interaction. In order to fit the data
of the accident model,
ε(r) = prob {ω ∈ Ω : e(r,ω) = 1}
must hold.
To begin with, suppose the actual move of nature ω is observable. Then
legal doctrine would hold A fully liable for L if the accident has actually
occurred under A’s negligent behavior but would have been avoided if A had
5Myerson (1999) attributes the important insight that any strategic interaction can be
expressed in normal form to John von Neumann.
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met his obligation. In all other cases, A would not be held liable. For short,
the quantum of damages awarded would amount to
D(ω) = max [e(rn,ω)− e(ro,ω), 0] · L,
well in line with the difference hypothesis.
Notice, if a positive quantum of damages is awarded thenD(ω) = [e(rn,ω)−
e(ro,ω)] ·L and the wealth position of party B is exactly the same as if party
A had met his obligation. In other words, B is exactly compensated for the
loss she suffers from A’s deviation. If, however, the move of nature is such
that the accident has actually been avoided but would have hypothetically
occurred if A had met his obligation (i.e. e(rn,ω) = 0 < e(ro,ω) = 1) then B
enjoys a hypothetical windfall gain. It is common legal practice that B may
keep such hypothetical windfall gains for free. As a consequence, B’s ex ante
expected wealth position E[−e(rn,ω)·L+D(ω)] including compensation may
exceed the ex ante expected wealth position E[−e(ro,ω) · L] if A had met
his obligation. Legal scholars tend to dislike such overcompensation. Yet,
let me emphasize that such overcompensation is not due to the quantum of
damages as specified above but rather to the legal practice that hypothetical
windfall gains are kept for free. It will be shown in section 5 below, that
overcompensation, quite generally, does not distort incentives if party A’s
obligation obeys the Hand Formula.
This settles the issue of correct legal damages if the move of nature can
be observed. Typically, however, the actual move of nature itself will not
be observable. As a way out, correct legal damages should still be granted
though on average over the observed event. More precisely, if the event
Ω ⊂ Ω is observed, average legal damages amount to
d(Ω) = E[D(ω) | Ω]
and, by definition, are equal to the expected value of correct legal damages
conditional on the observed event. Notice, if the outcome space is partitioned
into observable events Ω = Ω1 ∪ ... ∪ Ωi ∪ ... ∪ ΩI and if damages d(Ωi) are
granted in the event Ωi then B’s ex ante expected wealth position amounts
to
I[
i=1
prob (Ωi) ·
q
E[−e(rn,ω) · L | Ωi] + d(Ωi)
r
= E[−e(ro,ω) · L+D(ω)]
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as follows from Bayes’ formula. In other words, from the ex ante perspec-
tive, it does not matter whether the moves of nature are observable or not.
Incentives remain the same.
The focus of the present section will be on the event Ωa = {ω ∈ Ω :
e(rn,ω) = 1} that an accident has actually occurred. This event is assumed
to be observable. Suppose A has neglected his obligation and, indeed, an ac-
cident has occurred. For this event, windfall gains can be ruled out such that
D(ω) = [e(rn,ω)− e(ro,ω)] ·L holds for any move of nature ω ∈ Ωa. There-
fore, from the perspective of the event Ωa, party B is exactly compensated
for the loss from A’s deviation.. Due to uncompensated windfall gains, party
B’s ex ante wealth position may still be strictly higher than if party A had
met his obligation. In fact, let Ωw = {ω ∈ Ω : e(rn,ω) = 0 but e(ro,ω) = 1}
denote the event of such windfall gains. In the event Ωw, B does not suffer
from any harm and, obviously, cannot claim damages, i.e. D(ω) = 0. As
mentioned before, overcompensation from the ex ante perspective is due to
the practice that windfall gains may be kept for free and not to the proposed
specification of damages.
As a final piece of notation, let γ = prob Ωw denote the probability
of hypothetical windfall gains. Notice, in the introductory example, such
windfall gains would occur with positive probability. Then the following
proposition can be established.
Proposition 1 Legal damages on average over the event that an accident
has occurred amount to
d(Ωa) =
εn − εo + γ
εn · L
and can be calculated from the statistical data if, in addition, the probability
γ of hypothetical windfall gains is known.
Proof. Consider the partition Ω = Ωa∪Ω0∪Ωw of the outcome space where
Ω0 = {ω ∈ Ω : e(rn,ω) = e(ro,ω) = 0}.
It then follows from Bayes’ rule and from consistency with the statistical
data that
[εn − εo] · L = E [e(rn,ω)− e(ro,ω)] · L =
= π(Ωa) ·E [e(rn,ω)− e(ro,ω) | Ωa] · L− π(Ωw) · L =
= εn · d(Ωa)− γ · L
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from which the claim follows immediately.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this proposition. If meeting the
obligation would avoid the accident for sure, i.e. εo = 0 then windfall gains
cannot occur and average legal damages amount to d(Ωa) = L. Similarly,
if neglecting the obligation leads to an accident for sure, i.e. εn = 1 then
windfall gains would also not occur and average legal damages amount to
d(Ωa) = (1 − εo) · L. In general, if windfall gains can be ruled out then
average legal damages amount to
d(Ωa) =
εn − εo
εn · L. (1)
In extension of the introductory example, the accident model ε(r) is said
to exhibit pure uncertainty if the fact that an accident has occurred under
negligent behavior does not allow updating of believes for the hypothetical
situation. Under pure uncertainty, the probability of windfall gains amounts
to γ = (1 − εn) · εo and, except for degenerate cases, is positive indeed.
Moreover, it follows from the above proposition that average damages amount
to d(Ωa) = (1−εo) ·L provided that the probabilities underlying the accident
model reflect pure uncertainty.
Type-contingent uncertainty, in contrast, would be involved if the proba-
bility ε(r) results from relative frequencies of draws from samples containing
cases that differ in type. For illustration, recall the second setting of the in-
troduction where nature is assumed to select one ball out of a box containing
Ns small, Nm medium and Nb big balls. The ex ante probability of nature
picking a small ball is εo = Ns/(Ns+Nm+Nb) and of picking a medium ball
is εn− εo = Nm/(Ns+Nm+Nb). Yet, if a coarsely meshed net was used and
an accident has actually occurred then it is known that the ball cannot be
of big size. The updated probability that it was a ball of medium size then
amounts to Nm/(Ns + Nm) = (εn − εo)/εn and, hence, average legal dam-
ages are equal to (1), in line with Shavell’s proportionality rule but based on
the justification that correct legal damages are awarded on average over the
observed event.
At the other extreme, finally, where all accidents that occur if A has met
his obligation are of the windfall type, i.e. γ = εo, legal damages on average
over the observed event amount to d(Ω1) = L, in line with the traditional
negligence rule as pioneered by Brown (1973). Yet, to justify the traditional
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negligence rule, the occurrence of windfall gains must be at its implausible
extreme.
3 General distributions of asset values
The accident model with a fixed loss size is widely used as a workhorse for
the economic analysis of tort law. In real cases, however, the size of losses
may vary. In the present section, it is shown how the concept of damages on
average over observable events can be extended to more general distributions
of wealth.
Party A is still facing a decision r ∈ R at costs c(r) The decision affects
party B’s wealth v, which attains finitely many values from range Y = {v0 =
0 < ... < vi < ... < vH}. At decision r ∈ R, the value vi ∈ Y is attained
with probability fi(r). The cumulative distribution is denoted by Fi(r) =
Si
j=0 fj(r). The expected wealth is equal to
E[v | r] =
H[
i=0
fi(r) · vi = vH −
H−1[
i=0
Fi(r) · (vi+1 − vi).
The decision actually taken and the obligation are still denoted by rn and ro,
respectively. I assume first order stochastic dominance, i.e. Fi(rn) ≥ Fi(ro)
for all i with strict inequality for one i at least. It then follows that B’s
expected wealth is higher if the obligation was met, i.e. E[v | ro] > E[v | rn].
The following modification of the stylized example introduced in the pre-
vious section may serve as illustration: If party B’s sample of size H contains
k toxic units and i = H − k non-toxic elements then her wealth is reduced
to vi. If the sample is drawn at random then the probabilities amount to
fi(r
n) =

Kn
H−i

·

In
i


Kn+In
H
 and fj(ro) =

Ko
H−j

·

Io
j


Ko+Io
H
 .
Suppose it is known that A has neglected his obligation and that B’s
actual wealth is vi. To determine the quantum of damages due, her actual
wealth vi must be compared with her hypothetical wealth vj if A had met
his obligation. If this hypothetical wealth were known then the correct quan-
tum of damages would amount to Dij = max[vj − vi, 0] as follows from the
difference hypothesis.
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Typically, however, the hypothetical level of wealth cannot be observed.
In this case, the correct quantum of damages should still be awarded though
on average over the observed event. Since, in the hypothetical situation, party
B would draw another sample at random the situation would correspond
to one of pure uncertainty which means that v attains the value vj with
probability fj(ro). If it is observed that the actual value under negligent
behavior is vi then average damages amount to
di =
H[
j=i
fj(r
o) · (vj − vi).
To extend the setting beyond the above example, the interaction between
party A and nature must again be expressed in normal form. Nature is as-
sumed to contribute a random move ω ∈ Ω where nature’s choice is governed
by the probability measure π. The wealth function V : R × Ω → Y yields
the level of wealth v = V (r,ω) that results from the interaction between A’s
decision r and nature’s move ω. To be consistent with the data,
fi(r) = prob {ω ∈ Ω : V (r,ω) = vi}
is assumed to hold.
Suppose it is known that party A, by choosing rn 9= ro, has neglected
his obligation and that the move ω of nature is observed. Then correct legal
damages, according to the difference hypothesis, would amount to
D(ω) = max[V (ro,ω)− V (rn,ω), 0].
Party B’s ex ante expected wealth position E[V (rn,ω) + D(ω)] including
damages may again exceed the position E[V (ro,ω)] resulting from A’s meet-
ing his obligation. Again, such overcompensation is due to the legal practice
that hypothetical windfall gains are kept for free and not to the quantum of
damages as specified above.
In most cases, however, the move of nature cannot be observed but sup-
pose the actual value vi = V (rn,ω) is observable which means that the event
Ωi = {ω ∈ Ω : V (rn,ω) = vi}
is observable. Correct damages on average over the observed event then
amount to
d(Ωi) = E[D(ω) | Ωi].
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Notice, in contrast to the binary accident model examined in the previous
section, party B may be strictly better off even from the perspective of the
event Ωi. For such overcompensation to take place, hypothetical windfall
gains must occur with positive probability, i.e.
prob {ω ∈ Ω : V (rn,ω) = vi > V (ro,ω)} > 0
must hold. From the ex ante perspective, B’s expected wealth position is the
same as if moves of nature were observable, i.e. it holds that
E[V (rn,ω) +D(ω)] = E[V (rn,ω)] +
n[
i=1
prob (Ωi) · d(Ωi).
If hypothetical windfall gains are ruled out, the correct quantum of damages
can be calculated according to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the absence of hypothetical windfall gains, correct dam-
ages on average over the event Ωi that B’s actual wealth is vi amount to
d(Ωi) = E [V (r
o,ω) | Ωi]− vi. (2)
Proof. If windfall gains can be ruled out then D(ω) = V (ro,ω)− V (rn,ω)
must hold for any move of nature. Since E [V (rn,ω) | Ωi] = vi, claim (2) is
obviously true.
The obvious generalization of Shavell’s proportionality rule would be to
grant damages according to (2) even in cases where hypothetical windfall
gains cannot be ruled out. Yet, if the victim’s wealth attains more than two
values and if hypothetical windfall gains occur with positive probability this
solution may possibly assign a negative quantum of damages. In this sense,
a generalization of Shavell’s proportionality rule (beyond the accident model
with fixed loss size) generally leading to a non-negative quantum of damages
is not available.6
6Notice, if party B’s actual level of wealth cannot be observed, it would be possible to
grant damages according to Kahan’s (1989) rule which amount to E[V (ro,ω)− V (ro,ω)].
This means that, while taking averages over the observed event, windfall gains are offset
against losses.
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4 Two potential human injurers: an example
So far, the interaction between one human party and nature has been exam-
ined. In the present section, nature is replaced by a second human player.
Suppose both human injurers have neglected their obligations. As a con-
sequence, there are Kn = M1 +M2 toxic among a total of Kn + In units
around, out of which party B consumes a sample of size H randomly drawn.
Mq denotes the total number of toxic units supplied by q. If party B’s sample
happens to contain kc toxic units or more then her wealth is reduced by the
fixed amount L. Notice, in contrast to the example of section 2, nature does
no longer contribute toxic factors. Nevertheless, a move of nature remains
involved, which governs the random choice of the victim. I further assume
that no toxic units were around and, as a consequence, the accident would
have been avoided if both injurers had met their obligations.
What damages do the injurers owe to victim B? Most legal systems would
grant the victim recovery of the loss resulting from the injurers’ negligence.
Put differently, the victim is treated as if a single party were responsible for
the deviations. But in what proportions would the injurers be held liable?
To begin with, suppose it is known that B’s sample contains k = m1 +
m2 ≥ kc toxic units and that injurer q has contributedmq of them. Then legal
practice, quite likely, would have the injurers sharing damages in proportion
to their contributions such that party q would owe damages in the amount
of
Dq =
mq
m1 +m2
· L (3)
to the victim B. In particular, if it were known that all the toxic units came
from the same injurer, say m1 +m2 = m1 then injurer q = 1 would have to
bear the full loss on its own.
I now turn to the more interesting case where it is still known that victim
B’s sample actually contains k ≥ kc toxic elements but the shares contributed
by the two injures remain uncertain. In such a case, quite likely, courts would
hold the injurers liable in proportion of their market shares such that party
q would now owe damages in the amount of
Dq =
Mq
M1 +M2
· L (4)
to the victim B. It will be shown that market shares can be interpreted as
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expected or average proportions according to which the injurers have con-
tributed toxic units to the victim’s sample.
At the time courts are called in, the share of toxic units consumed by the
particular victim at hand and contributed by injurer q is not random any
more, it is just not known. From the ex ante view, however, this share would
be random. In fact, since the victim is visualized as drawing a sample of size
H, the ex ante probability p(m1,m2) that his sample will contain mq toxic
elements contributed by injurer q (q = 1, 2) amounts to
p(m1,m2) =

M1
m1

·

M2
m2

·

In
H−m1−m2


M1+M2+In
H
 .
Similarly, the probability that the sample contains exactly k toxic elements
amounts to
P (k) =
k[
m=0
p(m, k −m) =

M1+M2
k

·

In
H−k


M1+M2+In
H
 .
These ex ante probabilities may now be used to calculate average legal dam-
ages. If it is just known that the sample contains k toxic elements then
average damages owed by injurer q = 1 amount to
d1(k) =
k[
m=0
p(m,k −m)
P (k)
· m
k
· L.
The following proposition establishes that average damages in the above sense
are identical with liability in proportion to market shares.
Proposition 3 Suppose ex ante probabilities are used as weights to form
averages. Damages in proportion to market shares (4) are then equal to
correct damages (3) on average over the observed event.
Proof. The claim is established by the following calculation for injurer q = 1
(for the other injurer, a similar calculation applies):
d1(k) =
k[
m=0

M1
m

·

M2
k−m


M1+M2
k
 · m
k
· L
=
k[
m=1

M1−1
m−1

·

M2
k−m


M1+M2
k
 · M1
k
· L
=
k−1[
m=0

M1−1
m

·

M2
k−1−m


M1+M2
k
 · M1
k
· L
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=
M1+M2−1
k−1


M1+M2
k
 · M1
k
· L = M1
M1 +M2
· L
as was to be shown.
Notice, average damages owed by an injurer do not depend on the exact
number k of toxic elements consumed by the victim. Therefore, if it were
just known that the victim’s sample must have contained at least kc toxic
units, average damages would still be in proportion to market shares.
The example could easily be extended by having nature also contributing
toxic factors. Total damages owed by the injurers would then have to be
calculated as in section 2 by taking averages over the observed event. The
probabilities of the random draw in the hypothetical situation would have to
serve as weights. These damages d would then have to be shared according
to the principles laid down in the present section. It can be shown that,
under this scheme, injurer q would owe damages amounting to
dq =
Mq
M1 +M2
· d.
Total damages d awarded to the victim would differ from L if nature also
adds toxic factors but would still have to be borne in proportion to market
shares.
5 Multiple injurers and efficient incentives
Up to now, the focus was on the quantum of damages to be awarded in
line with the difference hypothesis. Concepts from microeconomic theory
were used to settle conceptual issues concerning the difference hypothesis
for situations where a reduction of a party’s wealth cannot be ruled out, not
even if all obligations were met. In this section, I turn to the more traditional
turf of the economic analysis of law. The quantum of damages affects the
incentives for precaution. It is shown that damages in line with the general
principles laid down in the present paper provide efficient incentives if the
obligations are consistent with the Hand Formula. To establish the efficiency
result in general, the model of section 3 is extended to multiple injurers.7
7For a systematic discussion of multilateral obligations in general, the reader is referred
to Schweizer (2005b).
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The class of potential injurers is denoted by q = 1, ..., Q. Party q is facing
a decision rq ∈ Rq and bears costs cq(rq). Profiles of decisions are denoted
by
r = (r1, ..., rq, ..., rQ) ∈ R = R1 × ...×Rq × ...×RQ
and total costs by
c(r) =
Q[
q=1
cq(rq).
Nature’s contribution is captured by the random move ω ∈ Ω. The wealth
v = V (r,ω) of party B resulting from the interaction attains values in the
range Y = {v0, ..., vH}. Value vi is attained with probability fi(r) if the
injurers have chosen profile r ∈ R.
Let Dq(r,ω) denote correct legal damages owed by party q to party B if
the injurers have chosen profile r ∈ R and nature’s move is ω ∈ Ω. Since
compensating the victim for the injurers’ negligence is at stake, party B
should be made as well off as if all the wrongdoings could be attributed to a
single party. According to this principle,
Q[
q=1
Dq(r,ω) = D(r,ω)
must hold where total damages amount to
D(r,ω) = max[V (ro,ω)− V (r,ω), 0] (5)
as in section 3.8 Under this principle, party B is at least as well off as if the
injurers had met their obligations, i.e.
V (r,ω) +D(r,ω) = V (r,ω) +
Q[
q=1
Dq(r,ω) ≥ V (ro,ω)
must hold for any profile r ∈ R.9
Suppose, by acting in concert and aiming at minimizing their total ex-
penses, the injurers have agreed to profile rc. Since one of their option would
have been to meet their obligations, as a group, they cannot be worse off
under the actions cooperatively chosen, i.e.
−E [D(rc,ω)]− c(rc) ≥ −E [D(ro,ω)]− c(ro) = −c(ro)
8Windfall gains do not occur if V (ro,ω) ≥ V (rn,ω) holds for all moves ω ∈ Ω of nature.
In this case, D(r,ω) = V (ro,ω)− V (rn,ω).
9This requirement corresponds to the saddle point property, which Schweizer (2005a)
has identified as the driving force behind efficient incentives in general.
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must hold. But party B, under rc, will also be at least as well off as under due
performance. It follows that damages as specified above provide incentives
to meet the normative content behind the obligation ro.
In particular, if the obligation profile ro = (ro1, ..., r
o
Q) ∈ R obeys the
(generalized) Hand Formula in the sense that it maximizes expected social
surplus, i.e.
E[V (ro,ω)]−c(ro) =
H[
i=0
fi(r
o)·vi−c(ro) ≥ E[V (r,ω)]−c(r) =
H[
i=0
fi(r)·vi−c(r)
then it follows that
−E [D(rc,ω)]− c(rc) ≤ −E [D(rc,ω)] +E[V (ro,ω)]− E[V (rc,ω)]− c(ro)
≤ −c(ro) ≤ −E [D(rc,ω)]− c(rc).
Therefore, all of the above inequalities must be binding and, hence, the co-
operatively chosen profile rc must be efficient. In other words, the injurers
cannot improve their joint position, not even by deviating from their obliga-
tion in a collusive way.
Finally, injurers can also not improve their position unilaterally if the
damage scheme satisfies one additional principle, namely no liability without
negligence. More precisely, if each potential injurer, by unilaterally meeting
his obligation, can escape liability, i.e.
Dq(r
o
q , r−q,ω) = 0
for any profile r−q of the other injurers then all injurers meeting their oblig-
ations is a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by such a damage scheme
as the following proposition establishes.
Proposition 4 If the injurers’ obligations obey the Hand Formula and dam-
ages are awarded, which fully compensates the victim for the injurers’ devia-
tions then, by meeting all their obligations, the injurers minimize the sum of
precaution costs and damages owed to B. If, in addition, no injurer who has
met his obligation is held liable then all parties have the incentive to meet
their obligations, i.e. ro is a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by such a
damage rule.
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Proof. The first claim has already been established above. To establish the
second claim, suppose all but injurer q have met their obligations. It then
follows from the first claim that
cq(rq) +
[
p=q
cp(r
o
p) +E[D(rq, r
o
−q,ω)] ≥ c(ro) = cq(roq) +
[
p=q
cop(rp)
and, hence that
cq(rq) +E[Dq(rq, r
o
−q,ω)] ≥ cq(roq)
must hold. The last inequality establishes that meeting his own obligation
is a best response of injurer q to all the other injurers meeting theirs and,
hence, the profile ro must be a Nash equilibrium indeed.
Notice, for the same reason as in section 3, party B may be better off
than if all the injurers had met their obligations. Nevertheless, incentives for
overinvestment in precaution do not arise because, by meeting his obligation,
each potential injurer avoids liability and, for that reason, has no incentives
to invest beyond.
6 Concluding remarks
One or several human injurers have negligently deviated from their obliga-
tions, which has resulted in a reduction of the victim’s wealth. What quan-
tum of damages should be awarded to the victim and how should the po-
tential injurers share liability? While many legal systems are making use of
what, in Germany at least, is referred to as the difference hypothesis different
courts, nevertheless, are coming up with rather disparate solutions in cases
where losses of chances are at stake. To overcome such disorder, the present
paper proposes — as a general principle — strictly to adhere to the difference
hypothesis and, if observability is limited, to take averages over the observed
event.
To implement the proposed scheme, probabilities as in the traditional ac-
cident model must be known. If these probabilities reflect pure uncertainty
correct damages on average over the observed event can easily be deter-
mined. If, however, the probabilities are type-contingent but types cannot
be observed then additional information would be needed.
In cases where several human injurers are involved rules are required of
how they should share the burden of liability. In practical cases, equal shares
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of market shares or other indicators of the specific case may serve as measures
ad hoc. As a plausible and generally available alternative, liability could also
be assigned in proportion to an injurer’s cost savings from neglecting his
obligation. In any case, from the efficiency viewpoint, the exact details of
the arrangement do not matter. If the Hand Formula is met, the victim is
treated as if the wrongdoings were due to a single party and the negligence
principle is maintained then the damage scheme generates efficient incentives
for precaution quite generally.
The present paper is extending principles, elsewhere widely accepted by
legal practice, to damages for losses of chances. I am realist enough not to
expect that legal practice will quickly jump at the conclusions drawn from a
theoretical paper, particularly not if written by an economist. But, hopefully,
I have shown that tools from microeconomic theory allow to disentangle some
of the major issues at stake.
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